sealark

Warning, it's 12 pages long and not very assuring.

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OK let's get real about the oil flow. There doesn't really seem to be
much info on TOD that furthers more complete understanding of what's
really happening in the GOM.
As you have probably seen and maybe feel yourselves, there are several
things that do not appear to make sense regarding the actions of attack
against the well. Don't feel bad, there is much that doesn't make sense
even to professionals unless you take into account some important
variables that we are not being told about. There seems to me to be a
reluctance to face what cannot be termed anything less than grim
circumstances in my opinion. There certainly is a reluctance to inform
us regular people and all we have really gotten is a few dots here and
there...

First of all...set aside all your thoughts of plugging the well and
stopping it from blowing out oil using any method from the top down.
Plugs, big valves to just shut it off, pinching the pipe closed,
installing a new bop or lmrp, shooting any epoxy in it, top kills with
mud etc etc etc....forget that, it won't be happening..it's done and
over. In fact actually opening up the well at the subsea source and
allowing it to gush more is not only exactly what has happened, it was
probably necessary, or so they think anyway.

So you have to ask WHY? Why make it worse?...there really can only be
one answer and that answer does not bode well for all of us. It's really
an inescapable conclusion at this point, unless you want to believe that
every Oil and Gas professional involved suddenly just forgot everything
they know or woke up one morning and drank a few big cups of stupid and
got assigned to directing the response to this catastrophe. Nothing
makes sense unless you take this into account, but after you do...you
will see the "sense" behind what has happened and what is happening.
That conclusion is this:

The well bore structure is compromised "Down hole".

That is something which is a "Worst nightmare" conclusion to reach.
While many have been saying this for some time as with any complex
disaster of this proportion many have "said" a lot of things with no
real sound reasons or evidence for jumping to such conclusions, well
this time it appears that they may have jumped into the right place...

TOP KILL - FAILS:
This was probably our best and only chance to kill this well from the
top down. This "kill mud" is a tried and true method of killing wells
and usually has a very good chance of success. The depth of this well
presented some logistical challenges, but it really should not of
presented any functional obstructions. The pumping capacity was there
and it would have worked, should have worked, but it didn't.

It didn't work, but it did create evidence of what is really happening.
First of all the method used in this particular top kill made no sense,
did not follow the standard operating procedure used to kill many other
wells and in fact for the most part was completely contrary to the
procedure which would have given it any real chance of working.

When a well is "Killed" using this method heavy drill fluid"Mud" is
pumped at high volume and pressure into a leaking well. The leaks are
"behind" the point of access where the mud is fired in, in this casethe
"choke and Kill lines" which are at the very bottom of the BOP (BlowOut
Preventer) The heavy fluid gathers in the "behind" portion of the
leaking well assembly, while some will leak out, it very quickly
overtakes the flow of oil and only the heavier mud will leak out. Once
that "solid" flow of mud is established at the leak"behind" the well,
the mud pumps increase pressure and begin to overtake the pressure of
the oil deposit. The mud is established in a solid column that is driven
downward by the now stronger pumps. The heavy mud will create a solid
column that is so heavy that the oil deposit can no longer push it up,
shut off the pumps...the well is killed...it can no longer flow.

Usually this will happen fairly quickly, in fact for it to work at
all...it must happen quickly. There is no "trickle some mud in"because
that is not how a top kill works. The flowing oil will just flush out
the trickle and a solid column will never be established. Yet what we
were told was "It will take days to know whether it
worked"...."Top kill might take 48 hours to complete"...the onlyway it
could take days is if BP intended to do some "test fires" to test
integrity of the entire system. The actual "kill" can only take hoursby
nature because it must happen fairly rapidly. It also increases strain
on the "behind" portion and in this instance we all know that what
remained was fragile at best.

Early that afternoon we saw a massive flow burst out of the riser
"plume" area. This was the first test fire of high pressure mud
injection. Later on same day we saw a greatly increased flow out of the
kink leaks, this was mostly mud at that time as the kill mud is tanish
color due to the high amount of Barite which is added to it to weight it
and Barite is a white powder.

We later learned the pumping was shut down at <st1:time hour="0" minute="0">midnight</st1:time>,we weren't told
about that until almost 16 hours later, but by then...I'm sure BP had
learned the worst. The mud they were pumping in was not only leaking out
the "behind" leaks...it was leaking out of someplace forward...andsince
they were not even near being able to pump mud into the deposit itself,
because the well would be dead long before...and the oil was still
coming up, there could only be one conclusion...the wells casings were
ruptured and it was leaking "down hole"

They tried the "Junk shot"...the "bridging materials" whichalso failed
and likely made things worse in regards to the ruptured well casings.

"Despite successfully pumping a total of over 30,000 barrels of heavy
mud, in three attempts at rates of up to
80 barrels a minute, and deploying a wide range of different bridging
materials, the operation did not overcome the flow from the well."
<a href="http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&amp;contentId =7062487">http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&amp;contentId =7062487</a>
&lt;<a href="http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&amp;contentId =7062487">http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&amp;contentId =7062487</a>&gt;

80 Barrels per minute is over 200,000 gallons per hour, over 115,000
barrels per day...did we seen an increase over and above what was
already leaking out of 115k bpd?....we did not...it would have been a
massive increase in order of multiples and this did not happen.

"The whole purpose is to get the kill mud down,? said Wells. ?We'll have
50,000 barrels of mud on hand to kill this well. It's far more than
necessary, but we always like to have backup."

Try finding THAT quote around...it's been scrubbed...here's a cached
copy of a quote...
<a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WDj-HORTmIoJ:www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/deepwaterhorizon/7006870.html+%E2%809CThe+whole+purpose+is+to+get+t he+kill+mud+down,%E2%80%9D+said+Wells.+%E2%80%9CWe 'll+have+50,000+barrels+of+mud+on+hand+to+kill+thi s+well.+It's+far+more+than+necessary,+but+we+alway s+like+to+have+backup.%E2%80%9D&amp;cd=1&amp;hl=en &amp;ct=clnk&amp;gl=us">http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WDj-HORTmIoJ:www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/deepwaterhorizon/7006870.html+%E2%809CThe+whole+purpose+is+to+get+t he+kill+mud+down,%E2%80%9D+said+Wells.+%E2%80%9CWe 'll+have+50,000+barrels+of+mud+on+hand+to+kill+thi s+well.+It's+far+more+than+necessary,+but+we+alway s+like+to+have+backup.%E2%80%9D&amp;cd=1&amp;hl=en &amp;ct=clnk&amp;gl=us</a>

"The "top kill" effort, launched Wednesday afternoon by industryand
government engineers, had pumped enough drilling fluid to block oil and
gas spewing from the well, Allen said. The pressure from the well was
very low, he said, but persisting."

"Allen said one ship that was pumping fluid into the well had run out of
the fluid, or "mud," and that a second ship was on the way. He saidhe
was encouraged by the progress."
<a href="http://www.houmatoday.com/article/20100527/ARTICLES/100529348">http://www.houmatoday.com/article/20100527/ARTICLES/100529348</a>

Later we found out that Allen had no idea what was really going on and
had been "Unavailable all day"
<a href="http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/05/27/interview_with_coas">http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/05/27/interview_with_coas</a>...
&lt;<a href="http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/05/27/interview_with_coast_guard_admiral_thad_allen_1057 75.html">http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/05/27/interview_with_coast_guard_admiral_thad_allen_1057 75.html</a>&gt;

So what we had was BP running out of 50,000 barrels of mud in a very
short period of time. An amount far and above what they deemed necessary
to kill the well. Shutting down pumping 16 hours before telling anyone,
including the president. We were never really given a clear reason why
"Top Kill" failed, just that it couldn't overcome the well.

There is only one article anywhere that says anything else about it at
this time of writing...and it's a relatively obscure article from the
wall street journal "online" citing an unnamed source.

"WASHINGTON?BP PLC has concluded that its "top-kill" attemptlast week
to seal its broken well in the Gulf of
Mexico may have failed due to a malfunctioning disk inside the well
about 1,000 feet below the ocean floor.

The disk, part of the subsea safety infrastructure, may have ruptured
during the surge of oil and gas up the well on April 20 that led to the
explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig, BP officials said. The rig
sank two days later, triggering a leak that has since become the worst
in <st1:country-region><st1lace>U.S.</st1lace></st1:country-region>history.

The broken disk may have prevented the heavy drilling mud injected into
the well last week from getting far enough down the well to overcome the
pressure from the escaping oil and gas, people familiar with BP's
findings said. They said much of the drilling mud may also have escaped
from the well into the rock formation outside the wellbore.

As a result, BP wasn't able to get sufficient pressure to keep the oil
and gas at bay. If they had been able to build up sufficient pressure,
the company had hoped to pump in cement and seal off the well. The
effort was deemed a failure on Saturday.

BP started the top-kill effort Wednesday afternoon, shooting heavy
drilling fluids into the broken valve known as a blowout preventer. The
mud was driven by a 30,000 horsepower pump installed on a ship at the
surface. But it was clear from the start that a lot of the "kill mud"
was leaking out instead of going down into the well."
<a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870487560457528013357716426">http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870487560457528013357716426</a>...
&lt;<a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704875604575280133577164268.html"> http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704875604575280133577164268.html</a>&gt;

There are some inconsistencies with this article.
There are no "Disks" or "Subsea safety structure" 1,000feet below the
sea floor, all that is there is well bore. There is nothing that can
allow the mud or oil to "escape" into the rock formation outside the
well bore except the well, because it is the only thing there.

All the actions and few tid bits of information all lead to one
inescapable conclusion. The well pipes below the sea floor are broken
and leaking. Now you have some real data of how BP's actions are
evidence of that, as well as some murky statement from "BP officials"
confirming the same.

I took some time to go into a bit of detail concerning the failure of
Top Kill because this was a significant event. To those of us outside
the real inside loop, yet still fairly knowledgeable, it was a major
confirmation of what many feared. That the system below the sea floor
has serious failures of varying magnitude in the complicated chain, and
it is breaking down and it will continue to.

What does this mean?

It means they will never cap the gusher after the wellhead. They
cannot...the more they try and restrict the oil gushing out the
bop?...the more it will transfer to the leaks below. Just like a leaky
garden hose with a nozzle on it. When you open up the nozzle?...it
doesn't leak so bad, you close the nozzle?...it leaks real bad,
same dynamics. It is why they sawed the riser off...or tried to
anyway...but they clipped it off, to relieve pressure on the leaks "down
hole". I'm sure there was a bit of panic time after they crimp/pinched
off the large riser pipe and the Diamond wire saw got stuck and
failed...because that crimp diverted pressure and flow to the rupture
down below.

Contrary to what most of us would think as logical to stop the oil mess,
actually opening up the gushing well and making it gush more became
direction BP took after confirming that there was a leak. In fact if you
note their actions, that should become clear. They have shifted from
stopping or restricting the gusher to opening it up and catching it.
This only makes sense if they want to relieve pressure at the leak
hidden down below the seabed.....and that sort of leak is one of the
most dangerous and potentially damaging kind of leak there could be. It
is also inaccessible which compounds our problems. There is no way to
stop that leak from above, all they can do is relieve the pressure on it
and the only way to do that right now is to open up the nozzle above and
gush more oil into the gulf and hopefully catch it, which they have
done, they just neglected to tell us why, gee thanks.

A down hole leak is dangerous and damaging for several reasons.
There will be erosion throughout the entire beat up, beat on and beat
down remainder of the "system" including that inaccessible leak. The
same erosion I spoke about in the first post is still present and has
never stopped, cannot be stopped, is impossible to stop and will always
be present in and acting on anything that is left which has crude oil
"Product" rushing through it. There are abrasives still present,
swirling flow will create hot spots of wear and this erosion is
relentless and will always be present until eventually it wears away
enough material to break it's way out. It will slowly eat the bop away
especially at the now pinched off riser head and it will flow more and
more. Perhaps BP can outrun or keep up with that out flow with various
suckage methods for a period of time, but eventually the well will win
that race, just how long that race will be?...no one really
knows....However now?...there are other problems that a down hole leak
will and must produce that will compound this already bad situation.

This down hole leak will undermine the foundation of the seabed in and
around the well area. It also weakens the only thing holding up the
massive Blow Out Preventer's immense bulk of 450 tons. In fact?...we are
beginning to the results of the well's total integrity beginning to fail
due to the undermining being caused by the leaking well bore.

The first layer of the sea floor in the gulf is mostly lose material of
sand and silt. It doesn't hold up anything and isn't meant to, what
holds the entire subsea system of the Bop in place is the well itself.
The very large steel connectors of the initial well head "spud"stabbed
in to the sea floor. The Bop literally sits on top of the pipe and never
touches the sea bed, it wouldn't do anything in way of support if it
did. After several tens of feet the seabed does begin to support the
well connection laterally (side to side) you couldn't put a 450 ton
piece of machinery on top of a 100' tall pipe "in the air" andsubject
it to the side loads caused by the ocean currents and expect it not to
bend over...unless that pipe was very much larger than the machine
itself, which you all can see it is not. The well's piping in comparison
is actually very much smaller than the Blow Out Preventer and strong as
it may be, it relies on some support from the seabed to function and not
literally fall over...and it is now showing signs of doing just
that....falling over.

If you have been watching the live feed cams you may have noticed that
some of the ROVs are using an inclinometer...and inclinometer is an
instrument that measures "Incline" or tilt. The BOP is not supposedto
be tilting...and after the riser clip off operation it has begun to...

This is not the only problem that occurs due to erosion of the outer
area of the well casings. The way a well casing assembly functions it
that it is an assembly of different sized "tubes" that decrease insize
as they go down. These tubes have a connection to each other that is not
unlike a click or snap together locking action. After a certain length
is assembled they are cemented around the ouside to the earth that the
more rough drill hole is bored through in the well making process. A
very well put together and simply explained process of "How to drill a
deep water oil well" is available here:
<a href="http://www.treesfullofmoney.com/?p=1610">http://www.treesfullofmoney.com/?p=1610</a>

The well bore casings rely on the support that is created by the
cementing phase of well construction. Just like if you have many hands
holding a pipe up you could put some weight on the top and the many
hands could hold the pipe and the weight on top easily...but if there
were no hands gripping and holding the pipe?...all the weight must be
held up by the pipe alone. The series of connections between the
sections of casings are not designed to hold up the immense weight of
the BOP without all the "hands" that the cementing provides and they
will eventually buckle and fail when stressed beyond their design limits.

These are clear and present dangers to the battered subsea safety
structure (bop and lmrp) which is the only loose cork on this well we
have left. The immediate (first 1,000 feet) of well structure that
remains is now also undoubtedly compromised. However.....as bad as that
is?...it is far from the only possible problems with this very
problematic well. There were ongoing troubles with the entire process
during the drilling of this well. There were also many comprises made by
BP IMO which may have resulted in an overall weakened structure of the
entire well system all the way to the bottom plug which is over 12,000
feet deep. Problems with the cementing procedure which was done by
Haliburton and was deemed as ?was against our best practices.? by a
Haliburton employee on April 1st weeks before the well blew out. There
is much more and I won't go into detail right now concerning the lower
end of the well and the troubles encountered during the whole creation
of this well and earlier "Well control" situations that were revieledin
various internal BP e-mails. I will add several links to those documents
and quotes from them below and for now, address the issues concerning
the upper portion of the well and the region of the sea floor.

What is likely to happen now?

Well...none of what is likely to happen is good, in fact...it's about as
bad as it gets. I am convinced the erosion and compromising of the
entire system is accelerating and attacking more key structural areas of
the well, the blow out preventer and surrounding strata holding it all
up and together. This is evidenced by the tilt of the blow out preventer
and the erosion which has exposed the well head connection. What
eventually will happen is that the blow out preventer will literally tip
over if they do not run supports to it as the currents push on it. I
suspect they will run those supports as cables tied to anchors very
soon, if they don't, they are inviting disaster that much sooner.

Eventually even that will be futile as the well casings cannot support
the weight of the massive system above with out the cement bond to the
earth and that bond is being eroded away. When enough is eroded away the
casings will buckle and the BOP will collapse the well. If and when you
begin to see oil and gas coming up around the well area from under the
BOP? or the area around the well head connection and casing sinking more
and more rapidly? ...it won't be too long after that the entire system
fails. BP must be aware of this, they are mapping the sea floor
sonically and that is not a mere exercise. Our Gov't must be well aware
too, they just are not telling us.

All of these things lead to only one place, a fully wide open well bore
directly to the oil deposit...after that, it goes into the realm of "the
worst things you can think of" The well may come completely apart as the
inner liners fail. There is still a very long drill string in the well,
that could literally come flying out...as I said...all the worst things
you can think of are a possibility, but the very least damaging outcome
as bad as it is, is that we are stuck with a wide open gusher blowing
out 150,000 barrels a day of raw oil or more. There isn't any "capdome"
or any other suck fixer device on earth that exists or could be built
that will stop it from gushing out and doing more and more damage to the
gulf. While at the same time also doing more damage to the well, making
the chance of halting it with a kill from the bottom up less and less
likely to work, which as it stands now?....is the only real chance we
have left to stop it all.

It's a race now...a race to drill the relief wells and take our last
chance at killing this monster before the whole weakened, wore out,
blown out, leaking and failing system gives up it's last gasp in a
horrific crescendo.

We are not even 2 months into it, barely half way by even optimistic
estimates. The damage done by the leaked oil now is virtually
immeasurable already and it will not get better, it can only get worse.
No matter how much they can collect, there will still be thousands and
thousands of gallons leaking out every minute, every hour of every day.
We have 2 months left before the relief wells are even near in position
and set up to take a kill shot and that is being optimistic as I said.

Over the next 2 months the mechanical situation also cannot improve, it
can only get worse, getting better is an impossibility. While they may
make some gains on collecting the leaked oil, the structural situation
cannot heal itself. It will continue to erode and flow out more oil and
eventually the inevitable collapse which cannot be stopped will happen.
It is only a simple matter of who can "get there first"...us or thewell.

We can only hope the race against that eventuality is one we can win,
but my assessment I am sad to say is that we will not.

The system will collapse or fail substantially before we reach the
finish line ahead of the well and the worst is yet to come.

Sorry to bring you that news, I know it is grim, but that is the way I
see it....I sincerely hope I am wrong.

We need to prepare for the possibility of this blow out sending more oil
into the gulf per week then what we already have now, because that is
what a collapse of the system will cause. All the collection efforts
that have captured oil will be erased in short order. The magnitude of
this disaster will increase exponentially by the time we can do anything
to halt it and our odds of actually even being able to halt it will go down.

The magnitude and impact of this disaster will eclipse anything we have
known in our life times if the worst or even near worst happens...

We are seeing the puny forces of man vs the awesome forces of nature.
We are going to need some luck and a lot of effort to win...
and if nature decides we ought to lose, we will....

Reference materials:

On April 1, a job log written by a Halliburton employee, Marvin Volek,
warns that BP?s use of cement ?was
against our best practices.?

An April 18 internal Halliburton memorandum indicates that Halliburton
again warned BP about its practices,
this time saying that a ?severe? gas flow problem would occur if the
casings were not centered more carefully.

Around that same time, a BP document shows, company officials chose a
type of casing with a greater risk of
collapsing.
<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/us/06rig.html?pagewanted=1&amp;sq=at_issue">http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/us/06rig.html?pagewanted=1&amp;sq=at_issue</a>...
&lt;<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/us/06rig.html?pagewanted=1&amp;sq=at_issue_in_gulf&am p;st=cse&amp;scp=1">http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/us/06rig.html?pagewanted=1&amp;sq=at_issue_in_gulf&am p;st=cse&amp;scp=1</a>&gt;

Mark Hafle, the BP drilling engineer who wrote plans for well casings
and cement seals on the Deepwater
Horizon's well, testified that the well had lost thousands of barrels of
mud at the bottom. But he said models
run onshore showed alterations to the cement program would resolve the
issues, and when asked if a cement
failure allowed the well to "flow" gas and oil, he wouldn'tcapitulate.

Hafle said he made several changes to casing designs in the last few
days before the well blew, including the
addition of the two casing liners that weren't part of the original well
design because of problems where the
earthen sides of the well were "ballooning." He also worked with
Halliburton engineers to design a plan for
sealing the well casings with cement.
<a href="http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/hearings_bp_ce">http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/hearings_bp_ce</a>...
&lt;<a href="http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/hearings_bp_cementing_engineer.html">http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/hearings_bp_cementing_engineer.html</a>&gt;

graphic of fail
<a href="http://media.nola.com/news_impact/other/oil-cause-050710.pdf">http://media.nola.com/news_impact/other/oil-cause-050710.pdf</a>
Casing joint
<a href="http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/files/OGL00001.gif">http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/files/OGL00001.gif</a>
Casing
<a href="http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/files/OGL00003.gif">http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/files/OGL00003.gif</a>

Kill may take until Christmas
<a href="http://preview.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-02/bp-gulf-of-mexico-oil-leak">http://preview.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-02/bp-gulf-of-mexico-oil-leak</a>-...
&lt;<a href="http://preview.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-02/bp-gulf-of-mexico-oil-leak-may-last-until-christmas-in-worst-case-scenario.html">http://preview.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-02/bp-gulf-of-mexico-oil-leak-may-last-until-christmas-in-worst-case-scenario.html</a>&gt;

BP Used Riskier Method to Seal Well Before Blast
<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/us/27rig.html">http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/us/27rig.html</a>

BP memo test results
<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100512/Internal.BP.Email.Reg">http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100512/Internal.BP.Email.Reg</a>...
&lt;<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100512/Internal.BP.Email.Regarding.Negative.Test.Results. pdf">http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100512/Internal.BP.Email.Regarding.Negative.Test.Results. pdf</a>&gt;

Investigation results

The information from BP identifies several new warning signs of
problems. According to BP there were three flow
indicators from the well before the explosion.
<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100525/Memo.BP.Internal.Inve">http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100525/Memo.BP.Internal.Inve</a>...
&lt;<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100525/Memo.BP.Internal.Investigation.pdf">http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100525/Memo.BP.Internal.Investigation.pdf</a>&gt;

BP, what we know
<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100512/BP-What.We.Know.pdf">http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100512/BP-What.We.Know.pdf</a>

What could have happened

1. Before or during the cement job, an influx of hydrocarbon enters the
wellbore.
2. Influx is circulated during cement job to wellhead and BOP.
3. 9-7/8? casing hanger packoff set and positively tested to 6500 psi.
4. After 16.5 hours waiting on cement, a negative test performed on
wellbore below BOP.
(~ 1400 psi differential pressure on 9-7/8? casing hanger packoff and ~
2350 psi on
double valve float collar)
5. Packoff leaks allowing hydrocarbon to enter wellbore below BOP. 1400
psi shut in
pressure observed on drill pipe (no flow or pressure observed on kill line)
6. Hydrocarbon below BOP is unknowingly circulated to surface while
finishing displacing
the riser.
7. As hydrocarbon rises to surface, gas break out of solution further
reduces hydrostatic
pressure in well. Well begin to flow, BOPs and Emergency Disconnect
System (EDS)
activated but failed.
8. Packoff continues to leak allowing further influx from bottom.
Confidential
<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100512/BP-What.Could.Have.Ha">http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100512/BP-What.Could.Have.Ha</a>...
&lt;<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100512/BP-What.Could.Have.Happened.pdf">http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100512/BP-What.Could.Have.Happened.pdf</a>&gt;

T/A daily log 4-20
<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100512/TRO-Daily.Drilling.Re">http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100512/TRO-Daily.Drilling.Re</a>...
&lt;<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100512/TRO-Daily.Drilling.Report.04.20.2010.pdf">http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100512/TRO-Daily.Drilling.Report.04.20.2010.pdf</a>&gt;

Cement plug 12,150 ft SCMT logging tool
SCMT (Slim Cement Mapping Tool)
Schlumberger Partial CBL done.
<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100530/BP-HZN-CEC018441.pdf">http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100530/BP-HZN-CEC018441.pdf</a>

Schlum CBL tools
<a href="http://www.slb.com/~/media/Files/production/product_sheets/well_integrit">http://www.slb.com/~/media/Files/production/product_sheets/well_integrit</a>...
&lt;<a href="http://www.slb.com/%7E/media/Files/production/product_sheets/well_integrity/cement_bond_logging_tools.ashx">http://www.slb.com/%7E/media/Files/production/product_sheets/well_integrity/cement_bond_logging_tools.ashx</a>&gt;

Major concerns, well control, bop test.
<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100530/BP-HZN-CEC018375.pdf">http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100530/BP-HZN-CEC018375.pdf</a>

Energy &amp; commerce links to docs.
<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=articl">http ://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=articl</a>...
&lt;<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp; id=1985:energy-a-commerce-committee-investigates-deepwater-horizon-rig-oil-spill&amp;catid=122:media-advisories&amp;Itemid=55">http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp; id=1985:energy-a-commerce-committee-investigates-deepwater-horizon-rig-oil-spill&amp;catid=122:media-advisories&amp;Itemid=55</a>&gt;

well head on sea floor
<a href="http://nca-group.com/bilder//Trolla/A.%20GVI%20of%20Trolla%20prior%20to%20WHP002%20(2) .jpg">http://nca-group.com/bilder//Trolla/A.%20GVI%20of%20Trolla%20prior%20to%20WHP002%20(2) .jpg</a>

Well head on deck of ship
<a href="http://nca-group.com/bilder//Trolla/DSC_0189.JPG">http://nca-group.com/bilder//Trolla/DSC_0189.JPG</a>

BP's youtube propoganda page, a lot of rarely seen vids here....FWIW
<a href="http://www.youtube.com/user/DeepwaterHorizonJIC">http://www.youtube.com/user/DeepwaterHorizonJIC</a>
<a href="http://www.godlikeproductions.com/forum1/message1097505/pg1">http://www.godlikeproductions.com/forum1/message1097505/pg1</a>
<br style=""><br style=""></p>

FreeLine

Sealark, what is the source of this information? Or is this your own analysis? It seems well-reasoned and does answer some questions that I have had about BP's actions regarding the well.

bmoore

I read this twice.

All of that does make sense. Lets hope that it is an incorrect assesment..but I doubt it.

They are at 13978 out of 18000. 4000 feet to go. If this is indeed a race against time and the entire ugly thing is collapsing, they need to throw caution to the wind and go balls out as fast as possible.

jw1973

Sealark, this scares the piss out of me.

Mullethead

Sealark - much more detailed - but consistent with what i have heard from oil field engineers over here in LA - they told me that after top kill did not work - that the problem was much farther down - and only hopeisrelief well, and they better hurry.

What was your source for this? Reads like a blog entry

sealark

No, it's not from my head here's the link to the oil drum forum. I will admit it's close to what I was saying..

http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6593#comment-648967

CrossCreek

Thanks for that info <span style="font-weight: bold;">sealark...........

__________________
PFF.. I Like It........

Mullethead

Thanks Ron - good work on digging this up and getting it out - good to know the situtation so we can plan - and while this senario is not confirmed - it makes the most sense - Damnit

A couple of things -

We need to prepare for several more weeks or months of oil leaking into Gulf - So get all the skimmer and clean-up resource we can -

How many releif wells are being drilled ? Given the scope of this leak - I would think they would stat at least two - or are they that confident in the one?

bmoore

Two relief wells are being drilled. Four would be better.

And if the above, worst case scenario, actually comes to be...oil will leak out of that SOB until it runs out. Probably not in our lifetimes...

tjwareusmc

I don't understand why there are not at least several relief well operations going on, why not?

If the casingcompletely fails, is the so-called nuclear option like the Russians have supposedly done a viable option?